1. Fixed credential-exfiltration risk in /api/proxy/image: Previously the endpoint could:

• accept arbitrary auth_id
• load stored API keys
• forward them to attacker-controlled URLs

2. Enforced outbound host allowlist globally Previously:

• allowlist existed
• but outgoingFetch() didn’t enforce it
• plugins/engines could bypass it

3. Fixed extension store path traversal Previously a malicious store manifest could:

• inject … paths
• escape install directories
• reference arbitrary files

4. Hardened proxy IP trust Previously:

• rate limiting trusted any X-Forwarded-For header
• clients could spoof their IP

5. Fixed inconsistent settings authentication Previously:

• settings UI stored an auth token
• but the settings modal didn’t send it when saving

6. Implemented Improved proxy deployment support

• Added proxy-aware behavior:
• DEGOOG_PUBLIC_BASE_URL for canonical URLs
• secure cookie handling when X-Forwarded-Proto=https

Additional Improvements:

• suggestion fetching hardened
• DuckDuckGo suggestion parsing fixed
• unified outbound request handling
• install state guard properly cleaned up

Made some other changes for my specific deployment. Very happy with your work so far. Thanks so much

It’s not, the second I cloned it and gave codex access it found a whole whack of privacy issues. This was 100% human coded